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BOOK REVIEW:

A LIBERAL THEORY

OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE'

Parvathi Menon*
The 'Statist order', which is at the centre of international law's defining
characteristic and source, used as the legal premise upon which States base their
arguments, is an artificial order, at best. Who creates norms in international law
and thereafter, who is required to respect it once it has acquired the status of a
customary norm, reflects on the world of 'equal and autonomous sovereigns'
imagined by those who engage in the sources argument.2 Thus, it is said to
create a normative order where the States make the laws (or exist as an external
normative order beyond the States, binding them). It is well accepted that the
notion of 'sovereignty' as the power that comes with one's factual existence as
a State, does not lie with the State alone anymore. The decision-makers in the
various nooks and crannies of our socio-economic fabric exert their control, thus
reconfiguring and disintegrating state sovereignty at different levels: below the State
and above the State. The book turns a blind eye to this important development
in international law and covers a number of issues that turn the focus back to the
Visiting Lecturer, University of The Gambia, Banjul. Symbiosis Law School (LL.B.),
London School of Economics and Political Science (LL.M.) and Harvard Law School
(LL.M.). I would like to thank David Kennedy for his critical insights, the influence of
which is evident in this review, and Aphrodite Giovanopoulou for her comments and
views on the liberal theory. All errors are the author's alone.
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See MARTTT KOSKFNNIFMIT, FROM Avorov To UTOPIA (2d ed. 2006) for the legal and the

pure fact approaches to sovereignty. Here I restrict the argument to the beneficiaries
of the order, if it is considered to exist external to the State, or the creators of the
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256 (1987).
Though there has been much debate surrounding the diminishing importance of
sovereignty in the international law discourse, I contend that the obfuscation of its
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mainstream statist approach to the discipline. Altman and Wellman bring about
a very expansive analysis of not merely what the liberal theory of international
justice is, but make a very concerted effort to debunk the myths that surround
the viewpoints espoused by various other theorists.
The idea of the State as the perceived state of normality' seems to be the
central theme the book pursues, in order to deem the relevance and successes of
doctrines like the right to self-determination. In that particular example, first, the
authors miss the irony the doctrine evinces- in order to exercise the right, they
claim, the State must possess a moral right, or the non-State group must possess
the right and the desideratum to become a State. This ignores the very nature of
the people exercising the right- are they subjects of international law, or do they
become subjects only after they exercise this collective right? The status of these
people is in a state of transition.' Second, the authors stress on the legitimacy of the
State to hinge on their 'proposed' respect for their citizens. It reinforces the fallacy
surrounding law's expectations that rarely match the reality of adjudging the State's
(lack of) respect for human rights.' It also vitiates the correlation between violence
and liberation/self-determination movements that must be taken into account
and are often found to misguide the international community or whoever might
be the 'external rationality agent', to the extent of justification for the disorder
created. Violence stemming from these movements often results in a plethora of
human rights violations, but in the name of their 'statist' pursuit, they continue
to enjoy the legitimacy not available to other human rights violators. I shall look
into these claims in the following paragraphs in order to extend my scepticism
towards the liberal theory of international justice, for its inability to convincingly
elucidate the realistic tensions faced within the international spectrum.
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THL C)LLLGL DL Flx>NCu (Arnold I. Davidson
ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2003); see a/so MICTix, FoUCAULT, DTSCTPLINE AND PUNISlI
(Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
Nathaniel Berman, Soveregnty in Abeyance, 17 EUR. J. INT'l. L. 203 (2000). If law normally
draws from sovereignty, then self-determination, he says, arises when that "sovereignty
is in abeyance".
Antony Anghie, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THF MAKING OF INTERNATTONAT LAW
246 (2007).
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In a fairly straightforward case put forth in the book, the authors draw an
interesting parallel between a State's ability to self-govern in the light of liberation
movements and the case of parents who, no matter how poor their parenting
skills, continue to assert the 'right' to bring up their children. Espoused as a case
against the conceived harm of intervention by foreign states into the territory
of the human rights violating state, the authors deem the existence of the 'right
to self-determination' as paramount, overriding any image of being a violator of
human rights standards. This view is fairly conflicting and hard to reconcile with
the legitimacy factor of the State. Whether it is the defacto existence as a State or the
dejure exercise of sovereignty, the mainstream idea of the State as the one factual
state of existence for 'entities' in international law, seems to be reified through
this book. Democratic governance within the State is not a pre-requisite for its
legitimacy- the book uses the Vaclav Havel example to drive home this point;
albeit in the same vein, the argument made is of the desideratum of the political
group of people, which, even if sounds democratic, is said to end at the point
of making that choice. Thereafter, the type of governance could be monarchic,
if that were the choice. I find agreeable the proposition that western democratic
ideals need not necessarily be the aspiration for all States- it is common practice
to invest in propagating mainstream notions, like that of democratic governance
models, as is often done with the statist one. What is bothersome in the arguments
advanced in the book is that the authors turn to the people in whom the ultimate
sovereignty vests- their choice of governance is considered to be an exercise of
their right to political self-determination and it is towards the fulfilment of the
doctrine that the authors find a non-democratic set up equally legitimate. This
leads me to the next fallacy as put forth in the language of law.
The issue of recognition of States is primary in discussions around creation
of States. Correlating the problem of recognition to democracy requirements
and the corollaryproblimatiqueof human rights violations, a plausible connection
made by Altman and Wellman is this: even if it might not be blatantly clear that
democratic societies have fewer human rights violations, the leverage possessed by
the states through this process of recognition puts a bar on liberations movements
that do not 'desire to' meet the standard prescribed by the 'civilized' 'western'
14'
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ideas (of what makes a 'peace-loving State').' This most definitely overlooks the
Fanon-like concern regarding the demarcation made between what are perceived
as civilized and uncivilized nations. International scholars often treat the politics
prevalent in the decision-making process like it is invisible.' To turn the creation
of States or the process of recognition into a legal requirement in international
law is to continue to wage that age-old futile battle of separating law from politics.
Basing this recognition on the levels of human rights violation is a far cry from
reality. The question, "who decides?", whether a legal or a moral question, is
intertwined with the concept of 'legal' recognition. It must be noted that the
'decision-makers' construct these ideas in order to shape an abnormality that
allows for innovative actions that can be projected as a means to revert to the
'normal' state of order. It is also of relevance the usage in the provision on the
'sources and evidence of international law generally', as found in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, provision 1 (b) which reads, "general
principles of law recognized by driliednations'.It was understood to differentiate
the barbaric practices of the uncivilized nations from the peace-loving, defined
legal systems of the civilized nations.
The third issue that I wish to discuss is that of secession. The right to
secession too hinges on the statist order. Relying on a very modernist approach,
the authors support nationalism, albeit urging that it occurs around the centrality
of the State. Without supporting state-breaking,' the deviance from the 'norm'
is advised only in the light of an examination of their political capacities. This
is extended to both, State and non-State entities." The question of secession
7
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Beiner ed., 1999).
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349-350 (2005).

NATIONATFTES (1931).
See Richard T. Ford, Lax ' Territoy: A History of Jurisdiction97(4) MicTi. L. RFV. 843-930
See

ROBERT REDSLOB, TI
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(1999) on the creation of sub-national identities and territories; BLNEDC1' ANDERSON,
LIAGINED CMIUNITIns (3d ed. 2006). The same walls that define the subject of the
liberation struggles createfreedoms and also facilitate confbrmity. In this way, the territorial
art of separation simultaneously creates "the liberties [and] ... the disciplines." Fouc urT,
DTSCTPLINE AND PUNISTI, supra note 5, at 195-228.
148

Book Review: A LiberalTheory of InternationalJustice

needs to be studied as a conflict between freedom and conobrmiy;" the right of
the seceding groups to exercise their political freedoms versus the existing State's
right to protect its territory by preventing secession, towards conforming to the
Statist desideratum.
Moving onto Chapter 4, on International Criminal Law, what is found as the
leitmotif of this book is the determination of legitimacy and illegitimacy of States.
Without really revealing a yardstick for measurement of this legitimacy, but merely
basing it on the absence of human rights violations, as found in previous chapters,
the authors are reducing the credibility of this so- called legitimacy factor and
its adjudication, alike. Altman and Wellman, through this chapter, repose faith in
the International Criminal Court, but more importantly distinguish it from ideas
of democracy and secession owing to the lacking institutional framework within
which the latter can be carried out. It might be worth noting in this context, the
existence of the institutionalization of concepts like democracy and secession
through their linkages with human rights and its related charters and treaties.
Arguably, on the other hand, international criminal law marks a paradigm-shifting
moment in the dialectical production and negotiation of the political. Further, in
institutionalizing a universal discourse of humanity and 'peace', it refuses to allow
political confrontation to take place within the international legal system in a way
that would maintain at least the risk of violence. In Schmittian

2

terms, international

criminal law rules out the possibility of the exception. Although the concept of
international criminality deployed in 1945 was not new, its institutionalization
was. From the perspective of the facilitation or foreclosure of political capacities,
I ask whether this institutionalization is positive or negative. Here, I am writing
against secular liberal institutionalists, who concentrate on progressively 'ending
impunity' to the neglect of this question.
The fifth chapter on political assassinations and armed interventions is almost
disturbing to the extent that it espouses an endorsement of the violence in the
larger interests of preservation of societies and justice. Killing a few to save the
11
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See SGamUND FREUD, CIVTITZATTON AND ITs DTSCONTENTS (1929). I borrow Freud's
typology to showcase the conflicting ethos that occurs in conflicts like Kashmir, Bosnia
and Ethiopia- of the freedom of the peoples vis-a-vis conformity to a category for
membership to the international community.
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rest is the failing utilitarian theory of scholars like Bentham and Jhering13 that
have been fought against by many scholars, especially those that hail from the
critical schools.1 4 Yet, principles of armed intervention and assassination continue
to have a strong foothold in discussions that surround 'law and justice'." The
irony is compelling. If intervention could deem a state illegitimate, as the authors
suggest mildly, using the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as an example, it could perhaps
help curb violence through a naming-shaming process. Holding that thought,
one must reconsider the possibilities keeping in mind the politics involved in the
de-legitimation techniques used by the international community. It is here that
the focus shifts to the States in question- are they the power wielders, or do they
merely yield to the demands of the power-wielders?

6

The authors deal with the

power factor in Chapter 6, as emanating from the wealth quotient, but do not
imagine that the poorer State will always be the oppressed, or rather, that being
poor is not equivalent to being the oppressed. What has not been discussed is
whether the converse is true; are the oppressed usually the poorer States, the
Others in international law?" With the emerging European-centric universalism,
the non-European people, through colonialism, were in effect subsumed within
the European order making the 'maintenance of the order' the pretext on which
massacres were carried out.1

Neither the laws of war, nor the law of nations

applied to non-Europeans." This non-inclusion must be examined through the rise
13
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RuDeLF VON JHLRING, L w \

\S MLE\Ns To \N END (1914) (Isaac Husik trans., 2006). How
far should social interest trump the individual will? Jhering says there is no overarching
principle that binds every situation; it, in fact, depends upon circumstances and therefore,
there is no general guide. See also Neil Duxbury, Jhering' Philosophy of Authority, 27(1)
Oxcoim J. L. STuD. 23-47 (2007).
See KELNNLDY, supra note 9, at 349-350.
Martti Koskenniemi, The Ladj Doth Protest Too Much: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in
InternationalLaw,65 MoD. L. REv. 159-175 (2002).
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See MTCTiET, FoAUTT, POER/KNOTEDGE (Colin Gordon ed., 1980) and SoCIETY MUST
BF DEENDED (David Macey trans., 2003).
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L\w AND IfS OTHERS (Anne Orford ed., 2006).
Quincy Wright, The Bombardment of Damascus,20 As. J. INT', L. 263 (1926); Seej. B. Atlay,
Legitimate and IllegitimateModes of Warfare,J. OF TiF SOC. OF Cow. LEGISLATTON 10 (1905).
SeeJohn Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non Intervention, in COuLLECTD WoRms (John Robson
ed., 1984). He stated that "to suppose that the same international customs, and the same
rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and
between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no statesman
can fall into."
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of the State as the sole source of law around which the 'international community'2
came to be created. The laws of war, as treaties that were binding only among
sovereign nations, therefore excluded the 'uncivilized' entities to begin with. The
institutionalization of this international community and thereby, of the exclusion
through the Mandate system and the United Nations, portray the continuance of
the depiction of the 'humanitarian' claims made by the 'civilized' unto the 'others'.
In the circumstances, it is often difficult to separate the poor from the perceived
'uncivilized' States and disconnect their relationship to the oppressed, the Others.
The juxtapositions of what is viewed as traditional international law and
modern international law should be interpreted as a means to participating in, and
indeed, partly creating deep shifts in the history. This can be seen as a method of
reconfiguring the power, where strength is equated with knowledge, so that the
State is neither institutionalized nor fetishized.This leads to a reflection on the
genealogy of liberalism (and the theory of the limitation of the power of the state)
and the role played by Hobbes at the heart of this genealogy. Here, law is normally
based on sovereignty and in extraordinaycases, "sovereignty is in abeyance".2 1 The
desire to conform to statist standards22 makes the idea of freedom a process
of proving, like in postcolonial theory, that we too can look civiififed. Equality as a

process versus equality as a result is crucial to be differentiated between here. The
resulting equality, of becoming a nation state and being subsumed into the statist
20
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SUSAN MARKS, TIH RIDDLE

OF AI CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAw, DEMOCRACY,
AND TTIE CRITTQUE OF IDEOLOGY (2003). She critiques the concept of the 'dominant

ideology', which underestimates the independent agency of the subaltern group that
exists beyond the ruling classes. I borrow her thesis to advance my argument that
'normality' as a pre-existent state of being of the international order presupposes
and imposes certain dominant ideas which tend to be internalised as the default state;
it ignores /abnormahses any resistance to such ideas. The resistance which leads to
'disorder', is thus argued to be antithetical to the normality. Seegenerall ABRAM CTIAYES
& ANTONTA HANDLER CIT\YES, TIE NEw SCWERETGNTY (1995). If self-determination
struggles bring with them the right to revolt against the repression/ suppression by
the State, it might be interesting to note that some scholars believe the formalist turn
to the right might obfuscate the political background against which it must operate.
See OFUATFY-KODJOF, TIE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMITNATTON IN INTERNATIONAI LAW
128-156 (1977).
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order is merely accommodative; the trangbrmation can occur only if the process is
based on equality principles,2 3 where different kinds of entities can co-exist within
the international order, without one always aspiring to exist as the other simply
because it is the only acceptable form of existence, the State. Whether it is groups,
populations or individuals who can assert their right to self-determination, it
needs to reflect on the process and the resulting 'state of normality' it encourages
within the international spectrum. And that is where one must strive for change.

23

See Roberto M. Unger, The CriticalLegalStudiesMovement, 96 HAuv. L. Rv. 561 (1983).
See also ROBEro M. UNGER, FALSL NELSSITY (2004); Lewis D. Sargentich, Complex
Enforcement (197 8). See general Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment:
Transformationand Legitimationin Anti-Dismimination Law, 101 H ARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
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